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ABSTRACT
The existing techniques describe methods to provide quantum resistant pre-shared key
distribution to secure different protocols used in different deployments. But existing methods does
not consider providing quantum resistant key distribution for securing the multicast traffic as well
multicast routing protocols (e.g., PIM) used in different deployments. The techniques presented
herein is to distribute post quantum keys to be used for securing the multicast traffic and multicast
routing protocol.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The existing techniques describe methods to provide quantum resistant pre-shared key
distribution to secure different protocols used in different deployments. But the existing methods
does not consider providing quantum resistant key distribution for securing the multicast traffic as
well multicast routing protocols (e.g., PIM) used in different deployments.
The techniques presented herein is to distribute post quantum keys to be used for securing
the multicast traffic and multicast routing protocol. As per this method, Blockchain Provider (BP)
runs QKS (Quantum Key Source) to generate unique Post Quantum Multicast Group Key PQMGK
(ID, Key) per multicast group (and/or per multicast IP address). But QKS requires common seed
secret value to generate unique pair of PQMGK (ID, Key), For this, BP generate common seed
secret value using HKDF function, which will be shared with the multicast nodes during
registration.
As part of the initial node bring up, multicast nodes registers with the Blockchain Provider.
After successful registration, Blockchain Provider share common seed secret value with the nodes
using secure mechanisms such as PKI (asymmetric key encryption) methods. And Blockchain
Provider generates unique PQMGK ID per multicast group (if it not already generated) by using
QKS. Further, this PQMGK ID is used to generate unique PQMGK Key which will be used for
encryption/decryption of the multicast traffic/protocol (to provide confidentiality). Blockchain
Provider would add transaction T with the attributes Multicast group name, Multicast group ID,
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Multicast IP address and PQMGK ID to the Hyperledger, which will be used by the sender and
receiver nodes to fetch PQMGK ID to generate PQMGK Key for encryption/decryption.

Figure-1 describe overall method to provide quantum resistant key distribution for securing
multicast traffic as well as multicast routing protocols.

Figure-1

On the sender: Whenever sender want to send multicast traffic for a multicast group, it encrypts
the packet using PQMGK Key (generated using PQMGK ID) and sent to the multicast group over
multicast IP address.
On the receiver: Multicast address of the receiving packet is used to fetch multicast group name/ID
and PQMGK ID from the Hyperledger. In-turn PQMGK ID is used to generate PQMGK Key by
using QKS. Receiver uses this PQMGK Key to decrypt the multicast traffic.
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The techniques presented herein is explained in detail as below:
A. Multicast Node Registration:
Let us say, all the nodes in the deployment (i.e., in a particular multicast group) are enabled
with Hyperledger functionality. Nodes in the multicast group are authenticated with Blockchain
Provider (BP) using secure credentials. Along with authentication, trustworthiness of the nodes is
established using simple attestation protocol.
•

To attest the node/instance/device, Blockchain Provider (BP) retrieves the Public
Attestation Identity Key PK_AIK_NODE of the node and sends a "nonce" to that node
(say, target node).

•

The target node answers with a quote that contains this "nonce" and its current Platform
Configuration Registers (PCR) values that are stored inside the local TPM of the target
node.

•

This quote is signed by the Private Attestation Identity Key SK_AIK_NODE of the target
node to ensure the integrity of the response.

•

After the receipt of the payload from the target node, BP compare the "nonce" to check the
freshness of the attestation and if this matches the expected value, compare the received
PCR values with a library of trusted node configurations. Note here, vTPM (or software
TAM) is used for the virtual/cloud/container deployments.

B. Exchange common secret seed value:
Blockchain Provider (which acts as a Key Server) generates common secret seed value and
share it with the multicast nodes using PKI (asymmetric key algorithm) method during node
registration. The nodes independently use common secret seed value to initialise the
QKS. Note: The Quantum Key Source (QKS) require common secret seed value to be used for
initialisation, so that it can generate unique pair of PQMGK (ID, Key).

C. Exchange Post Quantum Multicast Group Key ID (PQMGK ID):
Along with common secret seed value, Blockchain Provider generates PQMGK ID (unique
per multicast group) using QKS and distribute to the registered nodes by adding transaction T
(with attributes as multicast group name/ID, multicast IP address and the PQMGK ID) into the
Hyperledger. BP maintains list of all the multicast groups in distributed Hyperledger. BP help with
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accounting; lawful intercept and they maintain immutable records. Markle tree hash algorithms
(double SHA-256) are used for generation of public keys for enhanced security and enterprise
consensus algorithms such as Proof of elapsed time (PoET) or Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(PBFT) are used to synchronise database among all nodes in the deployment. Permissioned ledger
is used to allow only authenticated and trusted nodes to participate and share the multicast services.

For example: Let us say, Node-1 and Node-2 are part of same multicast group MG-1 with multicast
IP address 224.10.10.10.
•

On Node-1: Whenever Node-1 wants to send multicast traffic to the multicast group MG1, it fetches PQMGK ID corresponding to the multicast group MG-1 (and/or multicast IP
address) from the Hyperledger.

•

On Node-1: It uses this PQMGK ID to generate the PQMGK Key from its QKS, to encrypt
the multicast packet/traffic and sent over Multicast IP address.

•

On Node-2: Upon receiving the encrypted multicast packet/traffic data from the Node-1
with Multicast IP address 224.10.10.10, it fetches PQMGK ID corresponding to the
received Multicast IP address from the Hyperledger.

•

On Node-2: Using PQMGK ID, it generates PQMGK Key from its QKS to decrypt the
received multicast packet/traffic.

•

Note: QKS can generate unique pair of PQMGK (ID, Key) if it is initialised with common
secret seed value shared by the Blockchain Provider as part of initial registration.

The techniques presented here propose method to provide quantum resistant security to the
multicast traffic using QKS where-in, QKS generate unique pair of PQMGK (Key, ID), which
does not need any explicit negotiation of messages such as Anonce, Snonce etc., so that each
endpoint can generate Post Quantum Pre-Shared Key independently. Hence resistant to
cryptanalysis attacks. This method uses per-multicast group PQMGK ID maintained in the
Hyperledger to generate PQMGK Key to encrypt the traffic for that multicast group, so that along
with quantum secure, this method provides optimised/efficient method to provide per-multicast
group secure communication. Moreover, to better control over the multicast groups and to provide
privacy to the multicast group, this method incorporates policy-based access so that only registered
multicast groups can communicate each other.
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